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ENTROPY VERSUS ADAPTIVE DYNAMICS: 
CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE NATO DOCTRINE EVOLUTION
Evolution of global environment has accelerated signifi cantly since catalytic out-
break of the twenty fi rst century. Rapid explosion of globalization, fuelled by in-
formation technology, gave birth to the new world order. The newly born nature of 
the world is deeply rooted in conceptual vision of “system of systems” – network 
built by clusters of numerous actors, connected with each other across clouds of 
economy, politics, infrastructure, information, social and security domains. En-
hanced complexity paradoxically increased the tempo and momentum of “change”. 
As a result, the events, processes, advances and crises have all maintained vigorous 
speed since the beginning of the new century. Projecting future global trajectories 
in turbulent environment is hardly possible, nevertheless some predictive analysis 
are available for contemporary scholars. US National Intelligence Council study 
“Global Trends 2030”1 defi nes world’s present status as “a critical juncture in hu-
man history, which could lead to widely contrasting futures”2. The study identi-
fi es crisis prone global economy, governance gaps, potential for increased confl ict, 
wider scope of regional instability and impact of new technologies as critical game 
changers in upcoming decades. Turbulent nature of contemporary environment is 
further highlighted in numerous publications and analysis. Stewart Patrick in his 
1 Global Trends 2030 Alternative Worlds, December 2012, www.globaltrends2030.fi les.
wordpress.com/2012/11/global-trends-2030-november2012.pdf (acces: 10.08.2015).
2 Ibidem, p. 4.
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article “The Unruled Worlds” soberly acknowledges: “global disorder is here to 
stay, so the challenge is to make it work as well as possible”3. Wayne Michael Hall 
and Gary Citrenbaum underline the unpredictable character of contemporary and 
future environment. They both agree that global networks “cannot be squeezed or 
manipulated into mathematical formula or a program evaluation and review tech-
nique (PERT)to help people with engineering backgrounds understand their char-
acteristics, purposes and operations”4. Complexity, unpredictability, dynamics and 
rapid cascading effects dominated the perspective in all spheres of human activity. 
They overshadowed economy, politics, infrastructure, security, information and so-
cial domains. As a result an adaptive dynamics became an indispensable capability 
for any actor operating on global scale. 
Critical value of the capability to adapt in constantly fi brillating suprasystem 
has been widely recognized by actors operating in a security domain. It appears as 
no surprise since “Global Trends” report attributes security challenges to all four 
global “mega trends” (individual empowerment, diffusion of power, demographic 
patterns, growing food, water and energy nexus)5. The undeniable truth is that since 
the beginning of the new century the dynamics of the security has become much 
more global in scope. North Atlantic Alliance, as still the most robust actor at the 
security arena, has already been challenged by some of the new realities. Terrorist’ 
threat and terrorist’ attacks at some of the member states, asymmetric confl icts, 
counter piracy efforts, humanitarian challenges, hybrid threats, cyber security 
breaches and numerous other aspects compose new, dynamic landscapes of the 
Alliance existence. NATO’s survival is anchored in the capability to transform ad-
equately to global security atmospherics. Success of the NATO evolution requires 
more – it depends on accuracy of far reaching predictive analysis and transforma-
tion of its results into doctrines. Such hypothesis stimulates several questions: is the 
twenty eight nations’ Alliance prone to change or does its current weight produce 
too much organizational inertia? Has the Alliance identifi ed, analyzed and reacted 
to current ramifi cations of global change? How does the Alliance address growing 
complexity of global “system of systems”? Is the Alliance fl exible enough to ab-
sorb impact of unpredictable trajectories?
The aim of this article is to investigate the NATO ability to adapt to dynamic 
changes in global environment. Challenges the NATO faced as a result of changing 
security environment have fueled high level debate throughout the Alliance sum-
mits during the past decade. The theme which dominated the discussions is con-
stantly calibrated around growing complexity of contemporary crisis. Tendencies 
and trends dominating 21st century crisis call for sophisticated use of instruments 
of power. Such an approach is sometimes labelled as a “smart power” – a combina-
3 Source: S. Patrick, The Unruled World, “Foreign Affairs” January/February 2014. 
4 W.M. Hall, G. Citrenbaum, Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environ-
ments, 2009, p. 13.
5 Global Trends 2030…, op. cit., p. 10.
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tion of soft and hard responses, orchestrated within a framework of cohesive cam-
paign. As Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye described it – such application of 
power is “neither hard nor soft – it is the skillful combination of both. Smart pow-
er means developing an integrated strategy, resource base and tool kit to achieve 
objectives”6. Both theorists and practitioners of international security underline es-
sential meaning of “smartly” orchestrated multi-layered strategies. US Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton, interviewed by CBS News in 2009 admitted: “We must 
use what has been called smart power, the full range of tools at our disposal – dip-
lomatic, economic, military, political, legal and cultural – picking the right tool, 
or combination of tools, for each situation”7. NATO leaders initiated series of de-
bates in relation to this topic a decade ago. Intellectual unrest has been inspired by 
Danish representatives calling for verifi cation of the Alliance strategy. Offi cially 
put on the Riga summit agenda (2006), new outlook for operational thinking has 
been named “comprehensive approach”. The defi nition, although varying across 
Alliance, highlights in all of its versions a need for coordinated multidimensional 
response to a crisis. Moreland and Jasper describe common denominator of all 
defi nitions as being anchored in “a congruence of effort, not in unity of command. 
A working defi nition of the approach is the manifestation of the idea of mobiliz-
ing the resources of an entire society to succeed in complex operations”8. Within 
the scope of the article the author examines the philosophy of the comprehensive 
approach as the NATO strategic vision channeled along smart power concept. The 
fi rst section of the study is dedicated to the evolution of the strategic context. Ini-
tial attempts to integrate polarity in operational thinking, discussions and Alliance 
declarations are described and analyzed. Author also outlines some of the politi-
cal ramifi cations resulting from the conceptual studies applied within the NATO 
throughout the past decade. Consecutive section brings more details connected to 
the nature of the comprehensive approach. The study includes theoretical basis – 
defi nitions and terms as well as different national perspectives on multidimensional 
crisis response methods. As a part of this section author conducts a review of the 
NATO current doctrinal publications in order to investigate the level of the compre-
hensive approach operationalization. Throughout this portion of the article author 
will utilize Allied Command Operations Publication “Comprehensive Operations 
Planning Directive 1.0”, as primary source of reference. The section also seeks to 
illustrate theory by several examples of practical application of the comprehensive 
approach within the Alliance current command structure. 
6 A Smarter, More Secure America [in:] R.L. Armitage, J.S. Nye Jr., CSIS Commission on 
Smart Power, Washington 2007, p. 7. 
7 C.M. Schnaubelt, Towards a Comprehensive Approach: Integrating Civilian and Mili-
tary Concepts of Strategy, Rome 2011, p. 27.
8 Comprehensive Approach to Operations in Complex Environments, eds. S. Moreland, 
S. Jasper, 2014, p. 1.
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As a conclusion of the study, the author will attempt to confront the evolu-
tion of the NATO doctrine with the main lines of thought defi ned during 2014 
NATO Wales Summit. The fusion will be further used by the author to summarize 
the article with a few predictive conclusions in regard to the future evolution of 
the Alliance doctrine. This article is unclassifi ed and it is based on unclassifi ed 
resources only. 
Strategic context
The whole concept of the comprehensive approach (CA) is not a new paradigm. 
Multidimensional vision of the security with military force involved in non-mili-
tary tasks is as old as the history of state’ instruments of power with professional 
warfare embedded into it. Adrian Goldsworthy in his study dedicated to Roman 
Army describes embryonic forms of the comprehensive approach elaborating de-
tails of legionnaires’ roles in administration, reconstruction, law and order and 
economy9. Studies of contemporary scholars bring some more recent examples: 
Tanja Miscevic refers to Oliver Cromwell who utilized an orchestrated combina-
tion of warfare and diplomacy to infl uence the decision making of Duke of Savoy 
in the year of 165510. The twentieth century populated the history of warfare with 
numerous cases, representing multilayered approach to the security. These are es-
pecially visible in the post-World War II Europe, where allied armies were facing 
complex challenge of occupation and restoration of recaptured territories – includ-
ing vast areas of former Nazi Germany. Weight of the challenge has been widely 
recognized as too much for the capacity of military apparatus. Christopher M. 
Schnaubelt admitted in his study of the comprehensive approach, that the military 
was “doing so despite its reluctance, because there were no realistic alternatives to 
military control”. Second half of the past century, although relatively clear of the 
massive scale clashes, provided a fertile ground for hundreds of “small wars”, 
counter insurgencies, revolutions and terrorist operations. With the end of the cold 
war these unconventional forms of warfare dominated the scope of global security. 
NATO heavily engaged outside of its geographic borders, steadily learned new les-
sons. The Alliance had to transform its force structure and doctrine in order to be 
able to maintain better peace instead of just winning wars. Such reconstruction ap-
peared to be unavoidable since civil and economic instruments of power increased 
their importance in global crisis management endeavors. The tendency became the 
most visible in reference to so called “3 block wars” – complex confl icts in the 
course of which the responder was involved in the high intensity warfare, humani-
tarian assistance and reconstruction at the same time. Decades of the struggle with-
9 A. Goldsworthy, The Complete Roman Army, London 2003.
10 T. Miščević, Philosophy of the Comprehensive Approach to Security, “The New Centu-
ry” February 2013, No. 3, p. 2.
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in unpredictable and heavily complex environment pushed military thinkers into 
the state of justifi ed concern. Studies and exchange of thought resulted in evolution 
of the ideas. Classic counter insurgency philosophy gave birth to the smart power 
concepts, which in term have inspired discussions on basis of the comprehensive 
approach. At the outbreak of the twenty fi rst century, the North Atlantic community 
fi nally realized that the military forces “cannot merely focus on defeating or deter-
ring armed opposition; they must do so in a way that supports and reinforces the 
operations being conducted by the civilian organizations and the host government”11. 
Complexity of the global security environment has also been recognized as the 
paradigm extending “well beyond the traditional domain of any single government 
agency”12 (including military). Such conclusions provided grounds for the birth of 
comprehensive approach – the strategic vision, which is currently defi ned as: 
“cross-governmental generation and application of security, governance and devel-
opment services, expertise, structures and resources over time and distance in part-
nership with host nations, host regions, allied and partner governments and partner 
institutions, both governmental and non-governmental”13. The evolution, however, 
did not happen overnight and without international, strategic implications. The fi rst 
conceptual efforts were initiated by Danish military and diplomats early in the fi rst 
decade of the twenty fi rst century. Danes proposed the verifi cation of the current 
NATO strategic vision, which dated back to 1999 and had not been adequate to 
dynamically changing environment. Advocates of the reform advertised their ideas 
during workshops organized in Copenhagen in 2005. Initial vision quickly reso-
nated throughout the Alliance. Proponents of changes attracted interest and support 
in Canada, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Norway and Slovakia. After suc-
cessful nesting of the reformatory attitudes in Pentagon, the decision has been made 
to draft a letter proposing offi cial endorsement of the new approaches during NATO 
Summit in Riga. So called “Comprehensive Approach Initiative” (CAI) has been 
embedded in the agenda of the 2006 NATO Summit. During the meeting all Alli-
ance members agreed to rally around the comprehensive approach conceptual vi-
sion. The CAI narrative strongly resonated in Riga Summit Declaration as well. 
The document signed by all Alliance Heads of States included the following state-
ment: “Experience in Afghanistan and Kosovo demonstrates that today’s challeng-
es require a comprehensive approach by the international community involving 
a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments, while fully respecting mandates 
and autonomy of decisions of all actors, and provides precedents for this approach. 
To that end, while recognizing that NATO has no requirement to develop capabili-
11 P.V. Jakobsen, NATO’S Comprehensive Approach To Crisis Response Operations A Work 
In Slow Progress. DIIS report 2008:15, Copenhagen 2008, p. 9.
12 Secretary Robert Gates speech at Kansas State University, November 26, 2007; quoted 
at: C.M. Schnaubelt, Towards a Comprehensive Approach: Integrating Civilian and Military Con-
cepts of Strategy; Rome 2011.
13 J. Lindley-French, Operationalizing the Comprehensive Approach, 2010, p. 2, 
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ties strictly for civilian purposes, we have tasked today the Council in Permanent 
Session to develop pragmatic proposals in time for the meeting of Foreign Minis-
ters in April 2007 and Defense Ministers in June 2007 to improve coherent applica-
tion of NATO’s own crisis management instruments as well as practical coopera-
tion at all levels with partners, the UN and other relevant international organizations, 
Non-Governmental Organizations and local actors in the planning and conduct of 
ongoing and future operations wherever appropriate”14. As a consequence of such 
explicit declaration, top level NATO bureaucracy took over the task of drafting ac-
tion plan for further research and application of the new approach. Time was criti-
cal since the consecutive NATO Summit was scheduled for the upcoming year. 
Concerted efforts of several Alliance agencies and numerous subject matter experts 
resulted in a document draft, which had been forwarded and subsequently endorsed 
by the Heads of States during Bucharest meeting. The 2008 Summit declaration 
included further guidance. The NATO Members expressed their commitment in 
a form of the following statement: “Many of today’s security challenges cannot be 
successfully met by NATO acting alone. Meeting them can best be achieved 
through a broad partnership with the wider international community, as a part of 
a truly comprehensive approach (paragraph 4). Effective implementation of a com-
prehensive approach requires the cooperation and contribution of all major actors, 
including Non-Governmental organizations and relevant local bodies. To this end, 
it is essential for all major international actors to act in a coordinated way, and to 
apply a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments in a concerted effort that 
takes into account their respective strengths and mandates. We have endorsed an 
Action Plan comprising a set of pragmatic proposals to develop and implement 
NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach (paragraph 11)”15. New ap-
proach of the NATO to the security issues has been further reaffi rmed by a presence 
of UN Secretary General at Bucharest Summit. Implementation of the Action Plan 
obligated NATO Secretary General to form up a group of experts in order to iden-
tify details of the new strategic concept. Mr. Anders F. Rasmussen elected a group 
of twelve security experts representing different nations and functional branches. 
The team was chaired by the former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. 
“The twelve apostles” as the group was labelled in the Alliance jargon, continued 
its intense research for eight months. The study included briefi ngs by military and 
non-military security experts, consultations with the NATO and non- NATO states, 
workshops and conferences. Finally the report has been presented to the Secretary 
General in May 2010. Among the recommendations and observations, the CA “was 
regarded as inevitable for an Alliance, that has to cope with today’s threats and 
14 Riga Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in 
the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga on 29 November 2006; paragraph 10.
15 Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participat-
ing in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008; paragraph 4 and 11.
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challenges to the security of its members”16. The concept, outlining wide spectrum 
of the NATO strategy was titled “NATO 2020 – Assured Security, Dynamic Man-
agement, Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Stra-
tegic Concept for NATO”. The content was thoroughly studied and endorsed dur-
ing the Alliance Summit in Lisbon. The NATO states delegations once again 
appreciated the role of other than military instruments of power in a contemporary 
crisis response. This attitude was summarized in the following statement: “our op-
erational experience has taught us that military means, although essential, are not 
enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to our security. Both 
within and outside the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO must work with other actors to 
contribute to a comprehensive approach that effectively combines political, civilian 
and military crisis management instruments”17. Summit delegations also took fur-
ther steps in order to operationalize the concept of the CA. The following initiative 
was declared: “to improve NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach and 
its ability to contribute, when required, to stabilization and reconstruction, we have 
agreed to form an appropriate but modest civilian capability to interface more ef-
fectively with other actors and conduct appropriate planning in crisis management, 
as addressed in the political guidance mentioned above”18. Structural and concep-
tual visions, endorsed by the highest Alliance executive, were quickly translated 
into doctrinal narrative. Allied Joint Publication 01 (AJP01D) drafted in 2010 out-
lines strategic and operational level doctrine of the Alliance. It dedicates section 
2-11 to describe NATO contribution to the Comprehensive Approach. It offi cially 
recognizes the fact that “all military planning should be coherent with other non-
military and potentially multinational and non-governmental initiatives intended to 
stabilize and create a self-sustaining secure environment. A NATO military re-
sponse must therefore be integrated into a wider overall framework of a compre-
hensive approach”19. This capstone document provided a base of thoughts for fur-
ther NATO doctrinal publications outlining details of the operational practice. The 
study of these documents is a subject of a subsequent section of the article. 
Operationalization of the comprehensive approach
Several years of concerted efforts resulted in an adaptation of the new approach to 
crisis management. The approach was translated into the language of the doctrine, 
impacting heavily Alliance procedures, training and structures. Transformation of 
the vision into the practice was initiated relatively early. 2011 update to CA Action 
16 C.M. Schnaubelt, Towards a Comprehensive Approach…, op. cit., p. 56.
17 Lisbon Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating 
in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon; paragraph 8.
18 Lisbon Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating 
in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon; paragraph 9.
19 Allied Joint Doctrine, „Allied Joint Publication”-01(D), 2010, p. XII.
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Plan noted: “good progress has been made since the Lisbon Summit in adapting staff 
structures, crisis management procedures, training and education, and in improving 
NATO’s liaison with other bodies and actors. At the same time, working methods 
are being adapted across the board to meet the requirements of a comprehensive 
approach”20. The Alliance initially benefi ted from some progress already done in 
the fi eld of the CA by its individual members. UK has been involved unilaterally 
for a substantial period of time in numerous operations requiring multi-layered ap-
proach to the security. Consequently, studies similar to CA had been initiated in the 
British Army before the adaptation of the CAI by the NATO. In 2010 the report to 
House of Commons Defense Committee articulated principles of the comprehen-
sive approach as: “proactive engagement, shared understanding, outcome based 
thinking and collaborative working”21. They correspond very closely to later is-
sued NATO principles captured in Allied Joint Publication 01, which defi nes them 
in paragraph 0230 as: “proactive engagement, shared understanding, collaborative 
working and common goal”22. NATO did not produce a universal defi nition of the 
comprehensive approach, although the British Ministry of Defense classifi cation, 
despite its slightly generic nature; captures all of the major characteristics as: “com-
monly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likeli-
hood of favorable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation”23. Within 
the NATO command structure the task of formulating details of the new approach 
was delegated to Allied Command Transformation (ACT). Conceptual research 
was nested in the approaches defi ned during experiments facilitating effect based 
theories. The ACT was involved in several projects dedicated to new operational 
approach channeling operational thinking around so called “Effects Based Ap-
proach to Operations” (EBAO). Earlier studies were to some degree coherent with 
the comprehensive approach principles. Fusion of both concepts resonated in sev-
eral doctrinal publications – most important among them being Allied Joint Publi-
cation 01 defi ning joint doctrine. The publication key themes covered some of the 
CA essential features. AJP01 recognizes complex nature of a contemporary crisis, 
it underlines the need of military planning to be “coherent with other non-military 
and potentially multinational and non-governmental initiatives intended to stabilize 
and create a self-sustaining secure environment”24. Subsequent reading of the pub-
lication indicates that in crisis response domain the Alliance intents to engage in ex-
tensive horizontal integration with other than military instruments of power. AJP01 
drafters explicitly admitted that a necessary precondition for such integration is 
20 Implementation Of The Comprehensive Approach Action Plan And The Lisbon Summit 
Decisions On The Comprehensive Approach, dated 6 DEC 2011; prepared by the International 
Staff of the Secretary General, p. 2.
21 The Comprehensive Approach,. Seventh report of joint session 2009-2010, 09 March 
2010, p. 11.
22 Allied Joint Doctrine…, op. cit., paragraph 0230.
23 The Comprehensive Approach…, op. cit., p. 11.
24 Allied Joint Doctrine…, op. cit., p. XII.
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unity of purpose. Information sharing and consultations with external actors may 
lead to the reciprocal advantage in the spirit of the CA. NATO doctrine presumes 
that the complexity of contemporary crisis will bring numerous actors to the table. 
Full agreement on objectives in such densely populated landscape is not likely to 
be possible. That’s why the AJP01 narrative strongly highlights the importance of 
common purpose as the driver for cohesive delivery of effects. “Political agreement 
on a desired outcome is necessary for clarity on strategies and objectives; however 
complete agreement between different actors may be diffi cult to achieve and, in 
that case, developing a shared vision or unity of purpose should be pursued”25. 
Collaborative nature of the crisis response required some adjustments in the NATO 
operational planning procedures. The vision defi ned by the ACT inspired other ele-
ments of the Alliance command structure to verify their approaches. Allied Com-
mand Operations (ACO) responded promptly to new requirements, issuing in 2010 
the publication “Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning 
Directive” (COPD). The document was published in 2010, with its updated ver-
sion being released in 2013. The ACO assumed that successful comprehensive ap-
proach to operations is heavily dependent on thorough understanding of a complex 
crisis environment. The COPD introduces some new terminology to the military 
lexicon. The appreciation of strategic context, which in accordance with the pub-
lication is the fi rst step of the planning process, requires detailed analysis of so 
called “engagement space”. It is defi ned as “that part of the strategic environment 
relevant to a particular crisis in which the Alliance may decide, or has decided, to 
engage”26. The space is further segmented into political, military, economic, social, 
infrastructure and information domains (PMESII). Introduction of such conceptual 
framework indicates a clear recognition of other than military domains of a con-
temporary crisis, where other than military sources of power may be in the lead. 
Understanding of the nature and scale of the crisis in accordance to COPD is built 
not only on the basis of PMESII analysis. Planners are also obliged to identify, 
segment and analyze agendas of all infl uential actors operating across the theatre. 
The scope of this activity is also focused on neutral and friendly actors – thorough 
study of their objectives and agendas is designed to initiate comprehensive, opera-
tional planning. As a part of this process NATO planners are supposed to recognize 
“political goals and objectives, main characteristics, capabilities, strengths, weak-
nesses and relationships of each actor”27. Identifi cation of non-military institutions 
operating within the crisis area is conducted during “the Review of the Level and 
Scope of International Engagement”28. The COPD underlines a critical role of 
friendly environment understanding, such tendency is confi rmed within following 
25 Ibidem, paragraph 0230.
26 Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive, version 
1.0, p. L-2.
27 Ibidem, paragraph 4-18.
28 Ibidem, paragraph 4-13.
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statement: “the Operational Liaison and Planning Group (OPLG) needs to identify 
the relevant international actors operating in the area that could contribute to the 
resolution of the crisis, including those IOs, GOs and NGOs engaged in humani-
tarian aid, human rights, protection of minorities, refugees and displaced persons, 
legal assistance, medical care, reconstruction, agriculture, education, and general 
project funding. It is critical that the OLPG understands the mandate, role, struc-
ture, methods and principles of these organizations”29. Once they become clearly 
outlined, the NATO in accordance to its doctrine, determines its role in the coordi-
nating and enabling mode. Enabling in this case is understood as a security provi-
sion and other supporting functions as logistics, transportation, medicine etc. The 
alliance planners, in accordance with the COPD have to assure that the objectives 
are understood well enough to build cohesive plan of the response to the crisis. 
Coordinated planning and execution is best exercised by exchange of liaison with 
relevant organizations. The ACO publication recommends to take active steps in 
order to facilitate such arrangement. Paragraph 4-25 describes major contribution 
of the NATO planners to establish such cooperation networks, it includes identifi -
cation of:
• Arrangement for in-theatre coordination with cooperating civilian organi-
zations,
• Liaison requirements with local, international, governmental and non-gov-
ernmental entities30. 
The AJP01 and COPD as the two capstone doctrinal documents have shaped 
the content of numerous NATO manuals, instructions and procedures. The military 
structures absorbed new trends set by the narrative of the Alliance political leader-
ship. The vision sketched out by the group of experts led by Madeleine Albright and 
reinforced by a series of post-summit declarations translated into sound doctrine. 
It still evaluates as the NATO gains more experience throughout operations and 
exercises. The CA narrative however impacted more areas than just doctrine. Some 
implications may be also identifi ed in the Alliance structures. Comprehensive ap-
proach in accordance with AJP01 is exercised by the NATO at political-strategic, 
operational and theatre level. Sequentially following functions are related in paral-
lel to these levels: “confi dence, planning, cooperation/coordination”31. Implemen-
tation of the CA guidelines at political levels surprisingly encountered numerous 
diffi culties. NATO identifi es UN and EU as its major partners at this level so all the 
implications resulted from complex relationships between the Alliance and these 
particular actors. The debates concerning “how” to get NATO closer to the non-
military strategic actors were initiated with the discussion on basic model of civil 
military cooperation. Scholars exploring such relations defi ne three major concepts 
of civil-military cooperation, it is “civilian advisor model”; “parallel structures” or 
29 Ibidem, paragraph 4-13.
30 Ibidem, paragraph 4-25.
31 Allied Joint Doctrine…, op. cit., paragraph 0227.
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“integrated civilian military participation”32. NATO found it diffi cult to pick a com-
fortable model since the debate stalled due to duality of thought among some Al-
lies. The question of the NATO integrated civilian capability gave birth to a number 
of controversies. During the Lisbon Summit Allies declared the will “to form an 
appropriate but modest civilian capability to interface more effectively with other 
actors and conduct appropriate planning in crisis management”33. The issue of “ci-
vilian capability” divided Allies into those preferring wider, global role and those 
favoring more regionally focused, purely military nature of the Alliance. From the 
outset of this debate France vetoed the initiatives leading to robust civilian capabili-
ty of the NATO. As Viggo Jakobsen captured it: “France defi ned two red lines: fi rst, 
that NATO should not develop civilian capabilities or attempt to take the lead and 
coordinate other actors; and second, that NATO should place its military capacities 
‘at the service of the international community’ and nothing else”34. French Allies 
feared the idea of the NATO growing independence, since their perception was 
that it might have engaged the Alliance in a heavily US infl uenced, global policing 
role. Anglo-Saxon part of the Alliance was purely in favor of enlarged NATO ca-
pacity, enabling the Alliance to deal almost independently with non-military spec-
trum of the crisis. Such conceptual dichotomy produced a compromise solution, 
which included both – limited integral civilian capability of the NATO and strong 
liaison relations to the EU. The Union benefi ted from such compromise – it was 
granted an access to the NATO collective assets for operations where the Alliance 
as a whole was not militarily engaged. The compromise solution also included 
creation of the joint EU – NATO crisis response exercise plan and establishment 
of the EU–NATO Capability Group with the main purpose to facilitate information 
exchange. Additionally, both actors exchanged their liaison teams, locating them 
permanently at the EU Military Staff and in the NATO Supreme Headquarters. 
Strategic importance of the NATO–EU relationship has been confi rmed during 
Lisbon and Chicago summits. NATO 2010 Strategic Concept underlines the value 
of this bilateral alliance to the overall vision of the “comprehensive approach”. 
The Chicago Summit declaration defi nes common values and joint strategic inter-
est as the base for NATO–EU cooperation. The document also highlights the fact, 
that “strengthening this strategic partnership is particularly important in the current 
environment of austerity”35. Less robust but certainly not less vital is the NATO 
cooperation with the UN. Comprehensive approach to the strategy inspired the 
idea of the meeting between NATO and UN general secretaries in 2008. Memo-
32 C.M. Schnaubelt, Towards a Comprehensive Approach…, op. cit., p. 19.
33 Lisbon Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating 
in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon; paragraph 9.
34 P.V. Jakobsen, NATO’S Comprehensive Approach To Crisis Response Operations A Work 
In Slow Progress. DIIS report 2008:15, Copenhagen 2008, p. 9.
35 Chicago Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating 
in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago; paragraph 20.
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randum of Understanding signed at 23 September 2008 included statements reas-
suring mutual will for cooperation. Consequently NATO, although not having 
permanent presence in the UN headquarters, engages its partner regularly on all 
levels. As a result of improved cooperation NATO has supported UN sponsored 
missions in Darfur, Sudan and Somalia. The Alliance also facilitated UN disaster 
relief operation in Pakistan. Several NATO operations have been mandated by the 
UN – such endorsement builds international legitimacy for the Alliance security 
efforts. The NATO Secretary General briefs UN staff regularly on the progress 
of these operations. Cooperation with the UN, although not as robust as relations 
with EU, continues to grow. Experience of the past years dictated the main areas 
of common interest for the UN and NATO – they are currently defi ned as: com-
munication and information-sharing, capacity-building, training and exercises, 
lessons learned, planning and support for contingencies and operational coordi-
nation and support36. 
Introduction of the CA structural solutions to the NATO organic structures 
was less complicated. Although the Alliance, as it was mentioned earlier, have not 
built robust civilian capacity, the number of staff organizations were created in 
order to facilitate effective delivery of the comprehensive approach. At the highest 
level of the Alliance command – SHAPE, the comprehensive approach philosophy 
stimulated the creation of the Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management 
Centre (CCOMC). The main task of this organization is to monitor crisis develop-
ment and to plan options for the response. Creation of the center resulted from 
a series of experiments conducted under auspices of Allied Command Transforma-
tion. The research by ACT was summarized in the document “The Future Com-
prehensive Civil Military Interaction Concept” which among the other issues rec-
ommended creation of the CCOMC. The center currently consists of fi ve groups: 
Crisis Identifi cation, Current Operations, Estimations and Options, Response Di-
rection and Crisis Review. Such structural solution “represents a fundamentally 
new approach to the management of modern and future crisis and operations by 
connecting, enabling and integrating international, private and national organiza-
tions – most notably the EU and the UN, nongovernmental organizations, and host 
governments and institutions”37. Civilian capacity of the Alliance has been addi-
tionally reinforced by implementation of civilian advisor offi ces (CIVAD) at both 
strategic and operational level of command. Other structural elements, introduced 
to the Alliance network as a result of Lisbon Summit declaration, include Civil Mil-
itary Fusion Center and Civil Military Planning and Support Section. NATO civil 
military coordination elements at operational and tactical levels are theater specifi c 
and the solutions are dependent on specifi c regional and functional requirements. 
Most relevant elements of such structural delineation can be identifi ed basing on 
36 Source: NATO’s relations with the United Nations, 30.07.2014, www.nato.int/cps/en/na-
tohq/topics_50321.htm (acces: 10.08.2015).
37 L. Odgaard, Strategy in NATO Preparing for an Imperfect World, New York 2014.
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the Alliance experience gained in Afghanistan. Early initiatives in this particular 
mission have been started as early as 2003 – the Alliance then deployed Senior 
Civilian Representative to represent political spectrum of the NATO leadership. 
In the course of ensuing years development advisors were deployed to the Afghan 
theatre. The most visible CA instrument became operational with opening of the 
Post- Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund – the agency responsible for coordina-
tion of fi nancial aid. 
In 2007 the CA related reforms were in full speed, as a result the Alliance 
established a Comprehensive Approach Team (CAT) collocated with ISAF head-
quarters. Deployment of this cell was supposed to energize and orchestrate all ef-
forts dedicated to the comprehensive nature of Afghan campaign. The CAT was 
designed as a planning team within ISAF including a fusion of “ISAF forces, the 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), other UN agencies 
and NGOs”38. At the same year the NATO and UN came with the conclusion that 
it might be useful to “double hat” the position of the Alliance and UN senior civil-
ian representative. Although this idea has never materialized, it represents a proof 
of the CA inspired reapproachment of the two organizations. The comprehensive 
approach at the lowest tactical level was instrumentalized in form of the 26 Provin-
cial Reconstruction Teams. These units were joint military-civilian entities with the 
task to enable reconstruction at local levels. Working in the fi eld, the PRTs although 
criticized as a concept by numerous publicists, contributed a lot to the NATO ex-
perience in comprehensive operations at the lowest levels of command. The main 
reason for the criticism is in most cases anchored in low output of the concept. 
There are numerous reasons for low statistics, although the most important ones 
seem to be lack of country-wide coordination, underdevelopment and pathologic 
corruption of the host nation administrative and economic structures and – most of 
all, low security. 
The Joint International – Afghan Board was supposed to orchestrate efforts 
of the PRTs – after a failure of this organization the PRT Steering Committee took 
over. Despite all efforts the overall level of coordination for development endeav-
ors remained far from perfect throughout the whole campaign39. Despite the dif-
fi culties and harsh realities of unpredictable environment “the PRTs to an extent 
became symbols of the NATO adaptability: after all, what was foreign to NATO 
soon became an operational centerpiece”40. The PRTs also remain a symbol of the 
NATO evolution towards comprehensive nature of operational activity. 
38 P.V. Jakobsen, NATO’S Comprehensive Approach To Crisis Response Operations A Work 
In Slow Progress. DIIS report 2008:15, Copenhagen 2008, p. 22.
39 For more details see: S. Rynning, Of Sirens and Deceptive Virtue: A Critical Look at 
NATO’s Comprehensive Approach, Boston 2011.
40 Ibidem, p. 5.
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Conclusion
The year of 2014 exposed the Alliance to several unexpected events. Nothing cap-
tures it better than one of the paragraphs of the Wales Summit declaration: “Rus-
sia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vi-
sion of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. Growing instability in our southern 
neighborhood, from the Middle East to North Africa, as well as transnational and 
multi-dimensional threats, are also challenging our security. These all can have 
long-term consequences for peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region and 
stability across the globe”41. With the events in Ukraine and Middle East, NATO 
faced a fully blown complexity of the contemporary security environment. The cri-
sis is not novel in nature, however its intensity, global implications and proximity 
to the Alliance geographic border bring entirely new strategic context. During the 
summit in Wales the NATO leaders addressed global issues with new declarations. 
The offi cial statement signed by the heads of 28 member states reconfi rms the Al-
liance commitment to the comprehensive crisis response philosophy. Operational 
experience and analysis of the current situation maintain allies convinced that “the 
comprehensive political, civilian, and military approach is essential in crisis man-
agement and cooperative security”42. Multi-layered vision of the security fuels a ro-
bust relations between the Alliance and EU. In Wales NATO also underlined the 
importance of the OSCE as a partner organization in comprehensive security ef-
forts. Cooperation between these entities becomes vital especially in confrontation 
with the crisis in Ukraine. NATO clearly recognizes Russian politics as an “aggres-
sive action” – the need to react to such behavior was identifi ed during the summit. 
The comprehensive nature of current response to the crisis in Eastern Europe bases 
on a variety of measures taken in different areas. The Alliance cooperates closely 
with the EU as a prime non-military responder. Some steps in the military domain 
have also been taken as a part of the reassurance measures covered in Readiness 
Action Plan. NATO also monitors closely the crisis with its stand-off intelligence 
capabilities. The results of these efforts are consequently shaping the international 
opinion concerning the crisis. Comprehensive approach is further materialized in 
the form of the Alliance aid for Ukraine – this includes assistance to injured veter-
ans, cyber defense, logistic support and communications. To underline the nature of 
the program the Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen defi ned it as “a com-
prehensive and tailored package of measures”43. Outside Europe the Alliance still 
remains committed in Afghanistan, Mediterranean Sea, to some extent in Libya 
and Iraq. Scope and intensity of the contemporary crisis grows beyond past pre-
dictions. There is no “one type for all” solution for the security on the globe. The 
41 Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in 
the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales; paragraph 1.
42 Ibidem, paragraph 99.
43 NATO Wales Summit LibGuide, www.natolibguides.info/summit (acces: 10.08.2015).
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NATO is criticized for its operational effectiveness in Afghanistan and Libya, low 
involvement in countering Islamic threat also stimulates some critical narrative. 
Nothing indicates that the level of instability around the world will decrease in 
the nearest future. As the Secretary General concluded: “In these turbulent times 
NATO must be prepared to undertake the full range of missions and to defend 
Allies against the full range of threats”44. The comprehensive approach, initiated 
a decade ago does not offer universal solution for the peace and security in the 
NATO area of interest. Growing complexity of the contemporary crisis guarantees 
its relevance in upcoming decades, though. Experiences gained in the post-Cold 
War military engagements of the Alliance represent the best proof of the necessity 
for multi-dimensional cooperation in the security domain. Lessons learned seem 
to be captured and utilized not only by the Alliance, but also by other key global 
actors: EU and UN chief amongst them. Such tendency confi rms the purpose and 
importance of the comprehensive approach which most likely will dominate the 
Alliance doctrine in upcoming decades. 
Dynamika adaptacji – wpływ współczesnych konfl iktów na ewolucję doktryny NATO
Ostatnia dekada historii Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego wypełniona była wyzwaniami 
o niespotykanej dotąd skali różnorodności, co stało się przyczyną strategicznej debaty zainicjo-
wanej na szczeblach polityczno-wojskowych struktur dowodzenia i kierowania NATO. Dyskusje 
oscylowały wokół złożoności natury współczesnych konfl iktów oraz wpływu tego stanu rzeczy na 
doktryny sojuszu. Reagowanie kryzysowe w dobie XXI stulecia, zgodnie ze zidentyfi kowanymi 
trendami, wymaga wirtuozerii w dziedzinie posługiwania się instrumentami siły. Kombinacja tak 
zwanej hard power i soft power w narracji teoretyków doktryn zyskała miano smart power. Termin 
odnoszący się do pojęcia wielowymiarowych kampanii reagowania kryzysowego wywołał liczne 
refl eksje, których skutkiem stały się konsultacje oraz studia współczesnych strategii NATO. Refor-
matorskie tendencje po raz pierwszy zostały formalnie zdefi niowane na szczycie Sojuszu w Rydze 
w 2006 r. Inspirowane naturą współczesnych konfl iktów badania zaowocowały powstaniem nurtu 
strategicznego zwanego comprehensive approach (CA). Jego geneza sięga korzeni teorii smart 
power oraz effects based operations, natura natomiast jest mocno osadzona w skoordynowanym 
aplikowaniu militarnych, cywilnych i ekonomicznych instrumentów siły. Autor poddaje analizie 
genezę oraz okoliczności powstania fi lozofi i CA; ukazuje strategiczny kontekst budowy nowego 
nurtu w dziedzinie reagowania kryzysowego i naturę CA, przytaczając różne perspektywy narodo-
we. Analizie poddano aparat pojęciowy funkcjonujący obecnie w Sojuszu. W celu ukazania stopnia 
implementacji strategii na grunt doktryn operacyjnych różnych szczebli NATO. Autor przytacza 
przykłady rozwiązań strukturalnych w systemie dowodzenia Sojuszu, wynikających z konieczno-
ści dostosowania kształtu instytucji do nowej fi lozofi i działania. Opracowanie ilustruje również 
praktyczne zastosowanie CA na podstawie wybranych przykładów koncepcji wdrażanych w ra-
mach operacji NATO w Afganistanie. Podsumowanie to refl eksja dotycząca adekwatności compre-
hensive approach do wyzwań, które zdefi niowano na szycie Sojuszu w Walii. 
Słowa kluczowe: kompleksowe podejście, reagowanie kryzysowe, NATO, bezpieczeństwo 
międzynarodowe, bezpieczeństwo globalne, bezpieczeństwo europejskie, doktryna, strategia.
44 NATO leaders take decisions to ensure robust Alliance,5.09.2014, www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/news_112460.htm (acces: 10.08.2015).

